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Time to Re-Introduce a Directive on the use of Passenger Name Record Data 
1. Introduction 
 In the last fifteen months Europe has witnessed three major terrorist attacks, two in Paris in 
January and November 2015 and in Brussels in March 2016 killing 179 people in total. Prior 
to all three attacks terrorists had travelled form, to and within the European Union (EU). In 
addition to this, a terrorist attack was prevented by passengers on a Thalys train travelling 
from Amsterdam to Paris. Apart from attacks, a high number of EU citizens have travelled to 
conflict zones such as the terrorist group Islamic State’s self-proclaimed caliphate in Syria 
and Iraq, many of whom who have returned to EU Member States. In January 2015 the 
number of citizens from France, the UK, Germany and Belgium that travelled to join Islamic 
State was estimated to be 3,050 (BBC 2015), a number that has risen since then. As a result 
there have been calls for the EU to introduce a Passenger Name Record (PNR) data Directive 
to monitor passenger airline travel out of and to EU Member States. 
 PNR data transfer has not been without its problems and critique. This article will 
examine previous EU PNR agreements, mainly with the US, examining why they were 
problematic, with the main issue centring on the protection of passengers’ personal data. In 
2011 the EU attempted to introduce a PNR data Directive, but again this failed because there 
was insufficient safeguards protecting personal data. However, since 2011 there have been 
significant developments in the protection of personal data in the EU. This article will 
analyse two key decisions by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in Schrems 
and Digital Rights. Both cases had a significant impact on personal data that resulted in the 
termination of a trade agreement between the EU and the US, and, the striking down of EU 
and Member State legislation governing surveillance and data retention of electronic 
communications. As the EU has developed significantly since 2001 in the area of justice and 
home affairs, this article will examine the current 2015 PNR data Directive assessing if it will 
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satisfy the strict EU legal restrictions on protection of personal data. Due to the current 
terrorist threat the EU and its Member States face, it is argued there is a need for a PNR data 
Directive and it is submitted the 2015 proposal balances correctly the needs of national 
security with the protection of personal data. 
2. Previous EU PNR Transfer Agreements 
 Following Al Qaeda’s attack on the US on the 11th September 2001 (9/11) where Al 
Qaeda operatives hijacked civil aviation aircraft and flew them into the World Trade Centre 
in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, the US called for tighter control on civil 
aviation travel. This included recording details of airline passenger through PNR data, which 
through the US’ Aviation and Transport Security Act that was introduced in November 2001, 
became a statutory obligation. The Act required airline companies operating passenger flights 
to, from or through the US to provide US authorities with electronic access to PNR data that 
incudes passenger names and addresses, bank details, credit card details and information 
about meals ordered for flights (Kaunert, Leonard & McKenzie 2012, p.483). It was not until 
May 2004 when an agreement (Decision 2004/535/EC) was made to transfer PNR data from 
Europe to the US was agreed between the EU Commission and the US Department of 
Homeland Security (Argomaniz 2009 p.123). An obstacle for the EU in agreeing to the US 
requests for PNR data centred on the EU’s obligation under article 25 of the1995 Data 
Protection Directive (Directive 95/46/EC) that the EU should not transfer data to another 
country that cannot guarantee an adequate level of protection is ensured (Argomaniz 2009, 
p.123, Kaunert et al., 2012, p.484). 
 Under the 1995 Directive EU Member States must ensure that personal data is 
processed fairly and lawfully (article 6(1)(a)). The Directive clearly states personal data can 
only be collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purpose and not be processed in a way 
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incompatible with these purposes (article 6(1)(b)). Member States can only derogate from the 
Directive where it is necessary to safeguard national security, defence, public security and the 
prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences (article 13(1)). Prior 
to any data exchange it is the Commission’s responsibility to asses that the third country has 
an adequate level of protection of basic freedoms and rights of individuals (article 25(6)). 
Should the Commission find the third country does not provide an adequate level of 
protection, Member States are to take measures to prevent the transfer of data to the third 
country (article 25(4)). From the outset, one problem with the 2004 agreement was the duty 
on air carriers to provide PNR data, thereby placing them in a difficult situation. If they failed 
to pass on the PNR data to the US authorities they could face hefty fines or even lose their 
flying rights, but if they breached the 1995 Directive they could face fines from the EU 
(Kaunert et al. P.484) that could be up US$6,000 per passenger (Pawlak 2009, p.4). 
The 2004 agreement was annulled by the CJEU in European Parliament v European 
Council and Commission 2006.1 In reaching its decision the CJEU applied provisions 
contained in the 1995 Directive. However, the judgement does not really focus on issues 
related to data protection, rather whether the Directive’s scope in processing personal data 
fell outside Community law.2 Examining article 3(2) of the 1995 directive, the CJEU held as 
the sale of an airline ticket is a supply of a service, the collection of PNR data by airlines is 
an activity that falls within Community law, but the processing of that data that was regarded 
as being necessary for safeguarding public security and for law enforcement purposes 
resulted in the agreement being annulled. Referring to the earlier CJEU decision made six 
months earlier in Lindqvist 2003,3 and applying the provisions of article 3(2) of the 1995 
Directive that states the Directive does not apply top the processing of personal data in 
                                                          
1 Joined cases C-317/04 and C-138/04 
2 European Parliament v European Council and Commission, paragraph 54 
3 Case C-101/01 
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operations related to public security, defence, state security and areas of criminal law,4 the 
CJEU held the processing of PNR data by private companies falls outside the scope of the 
1996 Directive (paragraph 59). Key to this decision was that the 2004 agreement was 
incorrectly based on EU transport policy (which was the first pillar of the EU under the 
Treaty of Union) rather than the third pillar5 (which was justice and home affairs). As a result 
the CJEU did not address the issue of data protection guarantees by US authorities (Kaunert 
et al, p.485). A second PNR agreement between the EU and the US came into force in 2007 
based on the collection and processing of the data for state security and criminal law (Kaunert 
et al, 2012, p.485), that was replaced with a third PNR agreement between the EU and the US 
in 2012. The EU Council announced the 2012 agreement’s goal was to prevent, detect, 
investigate and prosecute terrorist offences and related crimes as well as to help with serious 
cross-border crimes (Council of European Union 2012). 
2.1 Criticism of Previous EU PNR Agreements 
In relation to EU PNR agreements there has been a degree of criticism. The main 
criticism is that in prioritising the expansion of counter-terrorism cooperation with third 
countries, especially the US, the EU was not so sensitive on data protection rules (Ilbiz, 
Kaunert and Anagnostakis. 2015, p.2). To some observers this has been more prevalent in the 
EU-US agreements than in EU negotiations with other third countries (Ilbiz et al. pp.8-13). In 
its building of network allies the EU’s key partner has been the US, where in spite of 
divergent strategic cultures, judicial and data protection practices no other international actor 
has influenced EU policies more comprehensively than the US which has led to concerns 
about the impact of this collaboration on European citizens’ privacy rights (Argomaniz 2012, 
p.95). To rationalise and provide an understanding why this is the case Lehrke and 
                                                          
4 case C-317/04 and C-318/04, paragraph 58 
5 The three pillars formed under the 1993 Treaty of Union became annulled under the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon 
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Schomaker have developed the network hypothesis where the more embedded a country, or 
in this case the EU, is in networks through which the US could exert influence, the stronger is 
that country’s counter-terrorism policy (2014, p.693). In applying this hypothesis Lehrke and 
Schomaker state that as the US has a presence in many different EU venues, the US was able 
to exercise influence of the Council and Commission (2014, p.698). This builds on Pawlak’s 
earlier study. For Pawlak as the EU’s security consciousness had not developed as rapidly as 
the US’, the US had the opportunity exert a big influence on transatlantic agenda with the EU 
thereby dictating and shaping the EU’s security agenda (2009, pp.9-10). Following the 
horrific Al Qaeda 9/11 attacks, the 2004 Madrid bombing and the 7/7 attacks in London in 
July 2005 it is understandable why the EU adopted the position they did. Addressing the 
threat posed by international Islamist groups EU bodies and agencies realised the need to be 
supportive in the international co-operation required to counter these groups posed to 
international security. In the early years of the 21st century the Justice and Home Affairs 
Commission and its related bodies such as its policing agency Europol were still in their 
infancy and developing. One can see how and why the US took advantage of the EU’s 
relative unpreparedness to counter terrorist threats. In fact prior to the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon 
Europol had to sell to EU Member States projects that must given priority whereas today 
projects are developed with Member States that are in line with Europol’s overall strategy 
(Busuoic and Groenleer 2013, p.293). As will be discussed, this change of position will 
underpin the submission that an EU PNR Directive would not be led by or under the 
influence of US policy and legalisation. In maintaining a strong position in protecting 
personal data, the fear of antagonising third countries has virtually evaporated as seen with 
recent CJEU decisions. 
3.  The EU’s Directive on Passenger Name Records 2011/0023 
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In 2015 the EU considered introducing a PNR data Directive, but it was not the first time 
the EU considered this. In February 2011 the European Commission produced a proposal for 
a PNR data Directive for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist 
offences and serious crime (2011/0023). At the time of its publication the explanatory 
memorandum drew a distinction between PNR data and aircraft passenger information (API)) 
stating that PNR data would be more effective in assisting agencies investigating terrorism 
and serious crime. Key to this is PNR data contains more information than API. While API 
contains a passenger’s name, date of birth, gender, nationality and passport details PNR data 
contains the following information: 
• Name of Passenger; 
• Contact details for the travel agent or airline office; 
• Ticketing details; 
• Itinerary of at least one segment, which must be the same for all passengers listed; 
• Name of person providing the information or making the booking; 
• Passenger gender; 
• Passport details (includes nationality, passport number and date of passport expiry); 
• Date and place of birth; 
• Billing information; 
• Form of payment (include debit/credit card details); 
• Contact details (potentially include landline/mobile phone numbers); 
• Frequent flyer data; and 
• Vendor remarks kept by the airline (International Civil Aviation Organisation (2010) 
Guidelines on Passenger Name Record (PNR) Data Quebec: International Civil 
Aviation organisation).  
 
API information was seen as restrictive by the European Commission who in the explanatory 
memorandum to the 2011 PNR Directive stated: 
‘API data does not enable law enforcement authorities to conduct an assessment 
of passengers and therefore do not facilitate the detection of hitherto “unknown” 
criminals or terrorists.’ [my emphasis] (2011/0023 Directive p.7). 
As PNR data contains wider information such as ascertaining who made the booking or 
contact details and methods of payment, this can be cross-checked by agencies making it 
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easier for their investigating officers to identify connections with terrorist suspects or 
criminals already in their intelligence systems.  
3.1. Concerns Regarding the 2011 PNR Directive   
The main concern with the proposed PNR data Directive was the sufficiency of protection of 
personal data especially in relation to the transfer of PNR data to third countries. In 
addressing this point the proposed period of detention of PNR data by a competent authority 
in the Directive was 30 days, with the Passenger Information Unit to retain the data for five 
years (Directive 2011/0023, article 9). In addition to the conditions laid down by the 1995 
Data Protection Directive, it was considered there was additional protection of personal data 
through the Justice and Home affairs Council Framework Decision regarding the protection 
of personal data processed in the framework of police and judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters.6 Under the Framework Decision the data subject has the right to expect the 
competent authority to fulfil its duties,7 which includes the right for the data subject to have a 
judicial remedy for any breach of the rights guaranteed to them by the applicable national 
law.8 Where PNR data is transferred to a third country once more the adequacy of data 
protection is mentioned as the Framework Decision is clear that prior to transfer of data from 
the EU the third country must have an adequate level of protection of the intended data 
processing.9 Even though these safeguards were mentioned, the European Parliament 
expressed concerns regarding the proposed method of automatically processing PNR data 
using fact based pre-determined assessment criteria was very wide and thought that such an 
assessment should never result in , “…profiling on the basis of sensitive data” (Directive 
2011/0023, Memorandum, p.10). In 2011 the European Data Protection Supervisor 
                                                          
6 FD 2008/977/JHA 
7 FD 2008/997/JHA, article 18 
8 FD 2008/997/JHA, article 20 
9 FD 2008/997/JHA, article 14 
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questioned if the PNR data Directive was necessary and proportionate as he saw in the 
Directive insufficient protection of the individual’s data privacy, a move he saw as 
contributing towards a surveillance society (Directive 2011/0023, Memorandum, p.10). 
4. The EU Adopts a Hard Line on Privacy: CJEU Decisions Related to Data Protection 
It is unfortunate that in European Parliament v European Council and Commission 
the CJEU did not address the question regarding the adequacy of data protection in third 
countries the EU makes agreements with, as the US has little in the way of legislative 
protection related to personal data. As Sotto and Simpson observe, the US legislative 
framework designed to protect personal data resembles a ‘patchwork quilt’ (2014, p.191). 
The lack of legal protection of personal data in the US has recently led to the EU annulling 
trade agreements, from which the CJEU decisions can be applied to PNR data exchange in 
any new directive.  
4.1 EU-US Trade Agreement: Safe-Harbour 
To protect EU citizens’ personal data the EU-US Safe Harbour agreement was signed in 
2000 under Decision 2000/520/EC in order to provide a streamlined process for US 
companies to comply with the 1995 Data Protection Directive. Among the privacy principles 
in the agreement it states that organisations must take reasonable precautions to protect 
personal information from loss, misuse and unauthorized access, disclosure, alteration and 
destruction.10 If US organisations flout EU privacy law the EU Commission can reverse the 
decision to grant the Safe Harbour arrangement.11 The agreement was mainly aimed at the 
private sector’s access to personal data for business purposes, but in November 2013 the 
                                                          
10 Annex I, paragraph 12 Dec 2000/520, Export.gov, US-EU Safe Harbor Overview at 
http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/eu/eg_main_018476.asp [accessed 23rd September 2015] 
11Art 3(4) Dec 2000/520European Commission, How will ‘safe harbor’ arrangement for personal data transfer 
to the US work? (09/10/2012) at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/thridcountries/adequacy-
faq1_en.htm [accessed 23rd September 2015] 
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European Commission expressed concerns over the large scale access by US Intelligence 
agencies to data transferred by Safe-Harbour certified companies (European Commission 
2013, p.18). This concern came from the disclosure and revelations by former employee of 
the US intelligence agency, National Security Agency (NSA), Edward Snowden that the NSA 
was involved in bulk data collection that included many EU citizens (Greenwld 2014, p.92). 
This led to the European Commission stressing the importance of the national security 
exception in the Safe-Harbour Decision should only be used when it is, ‘…strictly necessary 
or proportionate’.12 If the EU’s legal legitimacy credentials are to be measured, it is in the 
CJEU’s judicial interpretation and decisions that demonstrates how data protection is deeply 
embedded in EU law. 
4.2 Schrems Case 
Schrems, an Austrian citizen, used the social media network, Facebook, since 2008. 
Although his contract was registered within the EU at the time of his registration with 
Facebook Ireland, this is a subsidiary of Facebook Incorporated which is established in the 
US, where Facebook Ireland users’ personal data is then transferred to the US. Schrems 
contended that the law and practice in the US did not ensure sufficient protection of his 
personal data and in referring to the Snowden revelations of NSA practices, he claimed his 
personal data could have been subject to retention by the NSA and other US federal 
agencies.13 Perceiving Schrems’ complaint as unsustainable in law and bound to fail because 
he saw it as vexatious, the Irish Data Protection Commissioner did not see himself as being 
required to investigate the complaint as there was no evidence that Schrems’ personal data 
had been accessed by the NSA.14 In Schrems’ judicial review of the Irish Commissioner’s 
                                                          
12 Dec 2000/520, p.19 
13 Ibid, paragraphs [26] – [30] 
14 Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner Case C-362/14 (Advocate General Opinion - delivered 
23rd September 2015), paragraph [30] 
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decision,15 the Irish High Court held once personal data has been transferred to the US it is 
capable of being accessed by the NSA and other US federal agencies in the course of 
indiscriminate surveillance and interception of communications.16 Justice Hogan said if this 
matter was to be measured solely by Irish law and Irish constitutional standards a serious 
issue would arise which the Commissioner would have been required to investigate whether 
US law and practice in relation to privacy, interception and surveillance matched those 
standards.17 Acknowledging the Snowden revelations had exposed ‘gaping holes’ in 
contemporary US data protection practice,18 Justice Hogan did not see Schrems’ complaint as 
‘frivolous or vexatious’19and refereed it to the CJEU. 
Advocate General Bot held that as intervention of independent supervisory authorities is 
at the heart of the EU’s system of personal data protection, there must be a similar system of 
protection in the third country to which the data flows from the EU.20 In this case under the 
US’ surveillance Act, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 1978, the NSA accessed personal 
data inputted in Austria that was held by Facebook at a server in the US. Advocate General 
Bot held that the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court does not offer an effective judicial 
remedy to EU citizens whose personal data has been transferred to the US.21 He proposed 
that when the case went to the CJEU it should answer the question if the agreement is 
invalid.22 The CJEU did answer this question and declared the 2000/520 Decision as invalid23 
and consequently brought to an end the Safe Harbour Agreement. Crucial to the Court 
reaching this decision were the requirements of article 25 of the 95/46 Directive on data 
                                                          
15 Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner [2014] IEHC 310 
16 Ibid, paragraph [14] 
17 Ibid, paragraph [79] 
18 Ibid, paragraph[69] 
19 Ibid, paragraph [74] 
20 n 9, paragraph [210] 
21 Ibid, at [210] and [211] 
22 Ibid, at [237] 
23 n 1, paragraph [107] 
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protection. Where communications data is transferred from outside the EU to a third country, 
the EU is responsible for ensuring the third country has an adequate level of data protection. 
In doing so, consideration is given to the nature of the data, the purpose and duration of the 
processing operation of the data, the country of origin and final country of destination, the 
law in operation related to data protection in the third country and the professional rules and 
security measures deployed regarding the data in the third country.24  
The most pertinent part of article 25 related to the issue in Schrems is it being the 
Commission’s responsibility to find that the third country ensures an adequate level of 
protection of basic freedoms and rights of individuals.25 Should the Commission find the 
third country does not provide an adequate level of protection, Member States are to take 
measures to prevent the transfer of data to the third country.26 Crucial to determining this is 
what is meant by the term ‘adequate’. The third country is not required to ensure there is a 
level of data protection identical to that guaranteed in EU law,27 Advocate General Bot said 
that the protection implemented by the third country may differ from EU law, but it must 
provide adequate protection that is equivalent to that afforded by the 95/46 Directive.28 
Adopting the linguistic viewpoint of the word ‘adequate’ which means satisfactory or 
sufficient, Advocate General Bot said the obligation of the Commission is to ensure the third 
country has a sufficiently high level of protection of fundamental rights.29 The obligation to 
ensure the adequacy of data protection is not a one-off obligation made at the time of 
agreement. The obligation for the third country is an ongoing obligation to ensure that no 
changes in circumstances arise that can call into question the initial assessment30 and it is 
                                                          
24 art 25(2) Directive 95/46/EC 
25 Ibid, art 25(6) 
26 Ibid, art 25(4) 
27 n 1, paragraph [73] 
28 n 9, paragraph [141] 
29 Ibid, paragraph [142] 
30 Ibid, paragraph [147] 
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expected the Commission will regularly review the third country’s level of protection.31 It 
was on this legal point that Schrems was successful as the CJEU found the 2000 Decision did 
not cover the situation to limit interference by US state bodies authorised under legitimate 
objectives, such as national security, in US law to interfere with personal data transferred 
from the EU.32 The Court added that legislation permitting public authorities access to the 
content of electronic communications on a generalised basis must be regarded as 
compromising the essence of the fundamental right to privacy under the CFRF.33 On the 
latter point, the CJEU found there to be no effective remedy for an individual ensure the data 
was used in compliance with legal provisions similar to those found in the EU.34The main 
surprise from Schrems is not in finding that the Safe Harbour Agreement was ruled as invalid, 
with such gaping holes in US privacy law and lack of protection of personal data is that this 
Agreement lasted for fifteen years.  
It may come as a surprise that the US has no legislation that deeply embeds data 
protection within its legal system. Other western states that have agreements with the EU 
appear to apply similar legal principles in relation to data protection. For example the US’ 
northern neighbour, Canada has the Privacy Act 1985 as well as Personal Information 
Protection and Electronic Documents Act 2000, the latter being concerned solely with the use 
of electronically stored personal data. Both Acts are clear that personal information cannot be 
used unless it meets strict criteria35 similar to the provisions in the 95/46 Directive and both 
Acts also have sufficient safeguards where individuals can make complaints to the Privacy 
                                                          
31 Ibid, paragraph [137], n6, paragraph [76] 
32 n 1, paragraph [88] 
33 Ibid, paragraph [94] 
34 Ibid, paragraph [95] 




Commissioner36 and the Canadian courts.37 Likewise the Australia’s Privacy Act 1988 
contains similar provisions as the Canadian legislation with section 7 promoting the privacy 
of an individual’s personal data with the safeguards including complaints to the Australian 
Privacy Commissioner38 or to an Australian Court.39 As both Canada and Australia have 
agreements with the EU regarding the processing and transfer of passenger name record data 
held by air carriers40 the two respective states’ legislation clearly offers a level of protection 
equivalent to that afforded by the 95/46 Directive. The decisions in Digital Rights and 
Schrems demonstrates how EU law views the importance in protecting personal data and why 
it is best placed as an international actor to encourage those third countries it has agreements 
with to adopt similar measure in relation to data protection.  
4.3 Digital Rights Case 
How CJEU decisions impact on EU and Member States’ law was seen in Digital Rights 
Ireland41 where the Court ruled that an EU Directive was invalid.42 The case centred mainly 
on Directive 2006/24/EC that laid down an obligation on publicly available electronic 
communications services or public communications networks to retain certain data generated 
or processed by them. As collaboration between EU Member States was seen as critical, the 
Directive was introduced following the Al Qaeda attack in London 2005 with the intention to 
facilitate the exchange of personal data in order to enhance the prevention capabilities 
regarding acts of terrorism and crime (Bignami 2007, p.237). The 2006 Directive was also 
introduced to shift data protection rights from national to EU level thereby ensuring the 
                                                          
36 Ibid, s.29, s.11 
37 Ibid, s.34, s.46 
38s. 34 Privacy Act 1988 (Australia) 
39 Ibid, s.46 
40 Agreement (Canada) L 82/15, Agreement Australia L 186/4 
41 Digital Rights [2014]EUECJ C-293/12, [2014] 3 WLR 1607 
42 Ibid, paragraph [71] 
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police and the judiciary in one Member State respect the data protection rights in another 
Member State.43 As the Directive allowed EU Member States’ intelligence and policing 
agencies to collect bulk data, the CJEU examined the acceptable limits of mass surveillance 
and the function of data protection (Roberts 2015, p.538) in relation to compatibility with 
articles 7 and 8 EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms (CFRF). Regarding data 
protection the CJEU found the 2006 Directive to be invalid. Key to this decision was article 4 
of the Directive allowing Member States to adopt into its national law measures ensuring that 
data retention is provided only to the competent national authorities in specific cases. 
In Digital Rights the CJEU saw two key legal issues as important to ensure personal data 
is protected: 
1. EU legislation must lay down clear and precise rules governing the scope and 
application of the measure in question, especially in relation to access to and use of 
personal data; 
2. Minimum safeguards are imposed to provide sufficient guarantees effectively 
protecting personal data against the risk of abuse and against unlawful access and 
use.44 
 
 Analysing the inadequacies of article 4 in the 2006 Directive, the CJEU held it did 
not expressly provide that access to the use of the data was strictly restricted for the purpose 
of preventing and detecting precisely defined serious offences or of conducting criminal 
prosecutions relating to such crimes; the only conditions for Member States to retain data 
specified in article 4 was when it was necessary and proportionate to do so.45 The CJEU these 
data retention measures were too vague, as the principles of necessity alone cannot justify 
imposing limitations on citizens’ rights.46 While acknowledging that data retention is an 
important strand in terrorism and serious crime investigations to ensure public safety and it is 
                                                          
43 Ibid, pp.234-236 
44 Digital Rights [2014]EUECJ C-293/12, [2014] 3 WLR 1607 at [54] 
45 Ibid at [61] 
46 Ibid at [66] 
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in these specific grounds there could be a justification,47 in Digital Rights the CJEU has made 
it clear that the protection of personal data is equally important. The Digital Rights decision is 
not a ‘total knockout’ to mandatory retention (Ojanen, 2014, p.539). In drawing up legislation 
that specifically gives the legitimate aim for the retention such as to support investigations 
into acts of terrorism or serious organised crime, specifying realistic periods of data retention 
and sufficient safeguards into protecting rights of privacy and data protection would be 
sufficient. What the Digital Rights decision does is impose on the EU and member States’ 
legislators a new level of responsibility to protect fundamental rights, it composes substantive 
instructions for law-makers at EU and national level to guarantee the protection of data 
protection and, importantly, provides a strict judicial scrutiny test (Granger and Irion 2014, 
p.849).  
The impact of Digital Rights is seen in a number of Member states. In the UK R (on the 
application of Davis and ors) v Secretary of State for the Home Department and ors48 the 
High Court examined the provisions of data retention and how it balances with the protection 
of personal data in the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 (DRIPA) that was 
introduced by the UK government in response to the Digital Rights decision, Following the 
CJEU’s decision in Digital Rights he High Court held that regardless of the changes the UK 
Government made in relation to data retention, DRIPA still failed to provide sufficient 
safeguards against unlawful access to and use of retained data by public authorities and as 
such the Act infringed the principle of proportionality.49 Lord Justice Bean made it clear that 
in protecting fundamental rights in relation to personal data, derogations and limitations to 
that right must only occur when it is strictly necessary and this can only be achieved if 
legislation lays down clear and precise rules governing the scope of that derogation and 
                                                          
47 Ibid at [51] 
48 [2015] EWHC 2092 (Admin) 
49 Ibid, at [88] 
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limitation.50 He also added that sufficient safeguards should be imposed in order to give 
sufficient protection against the risk of abuse or unlawful access to that data. In saying this, 
he stressed the point that legislation permitting a general retention of personal data must 
expressly be restricted to the purpose of preventing, detecting, or, conducting prosecutions 
for serious offences.51  
In March 2015 a national Dutch court in The Hague followed the CJEU and found 
Holland’s surveillance and data retention law fell under the EU law and the CFRF. As the 
Dutch law failed to conform adequately to articles 7 and 8 of the CFRF, along with the court 
also finding insufficient safeguards, the Court suspended the Dutch law (Meyer 2015). 
Similar legal issues were found in the respective domestic statutory provisions regarding 
surveillance of communications post-Digital Rights by the respective judiciaries in Sweden, 
Romania and Belgium where their respective courts have held their legislation to be in breach 
of EU law.52 All of the Member State domestic court findings centred on two key legal points 
raised in Digital Rights, which are vague provisions to access and retain communications data 
and the lack of sufficient safeguards protecting potential abuse in the use of that data. From 
these court decisions it is clear that to achieve sufficient safeguards of data protection, the 
responsibility must be taken from politicians and placed with the judiciary or totally 
independent bodies.  
4.4 Main Points from the Schrems and Digital Rights Decisions 
What we witness with both of these cases is how the EU is maturing and becoming 
stronger in challenging legislation, agreements and decisions that impact on EU citizens’ 
                                                          
50 Ibid at [91a] 
51 Ibid at [91b] 
52 R (on the application of Davis and ors) v Secretary of State for the Home Department and ors, [2015] EWHC 
2092 (Admin), paragraph [111] 
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personal data. The Schrems case in particular demonstrates the moral courage of the EU’s 
judiciary to declare that arguably the most powerful economic state, the US’ law on privacy 
is lacking sufficient protection and is inadequate to handle EU citizens’ personal data thereby 
ending an important economic trade agreement. As a result of the CJEU’s decision in 
Schrems the Safe-Harbour Agreement was swiftly been replaced by the EU-US Privacy 
Shield where the US is committed to ensuring the US public authorities access to personal 
data will be subject to clear conditions, limitations and oversight, preventing generalised 
access with a complaint system to a dedicated new Ombudsman (European Commission 
Press Release 2016). This demonstrates how the EU’s standing as an influential and 
important international actor is increasing and maybe suggests that there has been a power 
shift from that discussed with the early EU-US PNR agreements that suggested that the 
power laid with the US. As we enter the second decade of the 21st century decisions like that 
seen in Schrems suggest that there is at least parity in the power paradigm between the EU 
and the US.  
The Digital Rights decision is equally important as the decision covers more than striking 
out one EU Directive, it impacted on legislation within the Member States. More importantly 
it set down a legal marker for all legislation and legal instruments to adhere to on issues 
around necessity, proportionality and importantly having specific reasons as to why statutory 
power should be given to state authorities to interfere with citizens’ personal data. This 
underpins agreements made by EU bodies and agencies with third countries. Another impact 
the Digital Rights decision has had in relation to EU legal instruments is in bringing to the 
fore the importence of adherence by the EU bodies and agencies as well as the Member 
States to the CFRF. While acting in a manner compatible with the European Convention of 
Human Rights which all EU Member States must signed up to, certainly post Digital Rights 
they must act in a manner than complies with the CFRF. 
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5. 2015 Proposed New Version of a PNR Directive   
A new draft text on an EU system for the use of PNR data was tabled by Timothy 
Kirkhope MEP which was discussed in the LIBE Committee on 26 February 2015 (Bakowski 
and Voronova 2015, p.4).  An evaluation of the necessity and proportionality of the proposal 
in the face of current security threats, its scope (list of offences covered), retention periods, 
the inclusion or exclusion of intra-EU flights, the connection with the on-going data 
protection reform, as well as the consequences of the CJEU judgment in Digital Rights, were 
among the issues discussed by MEPs.  
The changes proposed in the revised draft report include: 
• The scope of the proposal is narrowed to cover terrorist offences and serious 
"transnational" crime (the list of specific offences includes, for instance, 
trafficking in human beings, child pornography, trafficking in weapons, 
munitions and explosives); 
• Sensitive data to be permanently deleted no later than 30 days from the last 
receipt of PNR containing such data by competent authorities. Other data will 
continue to be masked after 30 days; 
• The inclusion of intra-EU flights (not initially included by the Commission, but 
the Council of the European Union favours the inclusion of internal EU flights); 
• 100% coverage of flights (the Commission text proposed to reach 100% 
coverage of international flights in gradual steps); 
• Access to the PNR data continues to be allowed for five years for terrorism, but 
is reduced to four years for serious crime; 
• Each EU Member State should appoint a data protection supervisory officer; 
• Persons who operate security controls, who access and analyse the PNR data, 
and operate the data logs, must be security cleared, and security trained; 
• The period for Member States to transpose the directive is extended from two to 
three years (given the specific technological and structural demands of setting 
up an EU PNR system for each Member State) (Bakowski and Voronova 2015 
pp.4-5).  
 
In addition to the terrorist attacks in Paris in January 2015, the Islamic Sate attacks in Paris 
on the 13th November 2015 may have accelerated movement by EU officials in relation to the 
2015 PNR Directive proposal as on the 4th December 2015 the Council of the European union 
moved swiftly to endorse the PNR Directive proposal that was approved by the European 
Parliaments’ Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs committee with a vote due in the 
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European Parliament in early 2016 (Papademetriou 2015). As the passenger movement to and 
from and within the EU has not just been with aircraft it is suggested that the Directive be 
amended to include inter-state rail and ship travel. 
4.1 European Data Protection Supervisor’s Concerns Over the 2015 PDR Directive 
Proposal 
 
 In September 2015 the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) published his 
opinion on the 2015 PNR data Directive. While in general he welcomed the improvements 
made by the European Council and civil liberties LIBE Committee on the provisions 
contained in the Directive regarding the provisions on data protection (EDPS Opinion 2015, 
p.15), he still has some reservations. On bulk and indiscriminate collection of data he 
recognised that PNR data would cover at least all flights to and from the EU concerning more 
than 300 million non-suspect passenger a year. The EDPS recommended that the Directive 
ensure that the data obtained pertained to a particular time period, geographical zone and a 
circle of particular persons likely to be involved in terrorism and serious crime (EDPS 
Opinion 2015, p.7). In addition to recommending that the data retention period be shorter 
than five years he is sceptical that the rationale to obtain PNR data under the notion of 
immediate and serious threat to public security or serious transnational crimes is sufficiently 
specific to meet the standards set in the Digital Rights decision (EDPS Opinion 2015, p.13).
 To help allay some of these concerns could be the role Europol plays. The EDPS 
recommends that the Member State agencies responsible for dealing with PNR data align 
themselves with the regime applicable to Europol to restrict conditions of access to the PNR 
data processed by the EU (EDPS Opinion, p.13). This is a logical step. Firstly Europol is 
subject of judicial scrutiny as post 2009 Treaty of Lisbon Europol’s actions are subject to 
judicial review by the CJEU (Busuioc and Groenleer 2013, p.299) and this would help ensure 
legal redress by citizens who are concerned their data has misused. The Treaty of Lisbon has 
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not just ensured there is solely judicial scrutiny of its actions, the Treaty also affords  the 
European Parliament as well as national parliaments authority over Europol (Occhipinti 2015, 
p.246) In addition to this Europol’s counter-terrorism role has gown,. Helping this growth has 
been Europol’s permanent unit of experts to provide national authorities with analysis and 
support. In addition to this Europol staff members have become increasingly important as 
project managers for its analytical work files that are being used more extensively because 
Europol has proven that its information sharing systems can be trusted to protect personal 
data (Occhpinti 2015, pp.239-241). Another key development in Europol has been the 
creation of the European Counter-Terrorism Centre (ECTC) where one of the aims of the 
ECTC is to improve information exchange between Member States’ law enforcement 
agencies.  On the ECTC, Europol’s Director, Rob Wainwright said: 
‘Our ambition is for the European Counter Terrorism Centre to become a central 
information hub in the fight against terrorism in the EU, providing analysis for 
ongoing investigations and contributing to a coordinated reaction in the event of 
major terrorist attacks. Europol is grateful for the support of the Member States, 
the European Parliament and the European Commission in the establishment of 
the ECTC. It will lie at the heart of a stronger EU standing up to the threat of 
terrorism.’ (Europol 2016) 
 
As Europol has the staff, resources and departments that are legally accountable thereby 
ensuring compliance with EU personal data law, this will enable Europol to scrutinise 
requests for PNR data on a case-by-case basis. With Europol scrutinising and co-ordination 
the transfer of PNR data, it will ensure that on the limited circumstances where there is 






 With the current terrorist threat facing many EU Member States it is of paramount 
importance that a PNR data Directive is introduced. As has been argued above, in recent 
years the EU has demonstrated it has the legal responsibility to protect personal data. This is 
important due to the high volume of passengers travelling to and from, as well as within the 
EU. Equally important is that to prevent any data mining that PNR data requests are closely 
monitored and controlled as the vast majority of passenger will be literally innocent travellers 
with no connections to terrorism or serious international criminal activity. Equally important 
is ensuring the needs of national security are also met. As stated, in the past fifteen 
months179 citizens have been killed in three terrorist attacks with many more seriosuly 
injured. The purpose of PNR data requests by relevant authorities is to prevent any further 
attacks and protect people from death or serious injury. Since 2001 when it was shown any 
PNR agreements were based on terms of third countries not the EU’s legal foundation, this 
situation has changed as seen in the Schrems decision where in protecting EU citizens’ 
personal data the CJEU had the courage to make a decision knowing it would terminate an 
important trade agreement between the US and the EU. A positive taken from that is a new 
agreement was quickly reached that did tighten up the protection of EU citizens’ personal 
data with the US. The EU also has its agencies like Europol, whose recent standing has been 
enhanced and can trusted to ensure that any PNR data request are strictly controlled on a 
case-by-case basis> Tis not only ensures the protection of personal data is secure, but 
importantly, Europol can also ensure the needs of security measures are also met. If there is 
one area where the PNR data Directive could be enhanced it would be to include inter-state 
rail and ship travel as the Thalys train incident in August 2015 showed, terrorists do not just 
use air travel. While the Directive will not totally stop terrorists travelling into and out of 
Europe, this Directive can help as a deterrent to terrorists using these modes of transport 
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